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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
JOSEPH PINTAR,
'
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISCase No.
SION OF UTAH AND COLUM9864
BIA GENEVA STEEL DIVIS I 0 N, UN I T E D STATES
STEEL CORPORATION,
Defendants-Respondents.

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
With the exceptions hereinafter set forth, respondents agree generally with the statement of facts in
appellant's brief.
The description of the nature and extent of injury
to Pintar and the statement that he was no longer able
to work after October 2, 1961 are not accurate but set
fo:rftthe contention of Pintar rather than facts shown
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by the record. The statements based upon the report
of Dr. Burke M. Snow are not statements of fact. Dr.
Snow's services for the examination of Pintar were not
obtained by respondents. His examination was made
at the request of Pintar as shown by his report dated
October 17, 1961 addressed "To Whom It May Concern''. (R. 1-4). ::Jir. Snow did not testify at the hearing
held September 4, 1962 which was the only hearing held.
(R. 30-40).

ARGUMENT
POINT I

The conclusion of the Industrial Commission that
there was no causal connection bet'lveen the injuries of
March 29, 1961 and July 25, 1961 and any disability
now existing is not directly contrary to the evidence and
is not erroneous as a matter of law.
There is no substantial evidence that Pintar has
any disability resulting from his injuries of March 29,
1961 and July 25, 1961. The Medical Panel Report
dated February 5, 1962 does not so disclose. (R. 25-27).
Boyd G. Holbrook, M.D., Chairman of the panel,
appeared at the hearing of September ·4, 1962, was
sworn and testified as a witness. (R. 31-40). He did
not so testify. The only suggestion of disability resulting from the industrial injuries appears in the conclusion of Dr. Burke M. Snow, who examined Pintar
on October 17, 1961, approximately three and one.:half
4
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months prior to the examination of Pintar by the
Medical Panel on February 5, 1962. The conclusions
of Dr. Snow were set forth on the last page of his report
(R. 4) as follows:
"CONCLUSIONS: From the available history given by the patient it seems that the only
conclusion one can come to is that this patient
received an aggravation of a previously existing
degeneration process in the lumbar spine. The
conditions were present and he had been working
daily and on a regular basis with no back complaints prior to his injury. The rib complaints
certainly are industrial."
Dr. Snow did not testify and his report being hearsay although admissible in evidence, is not competent
evidence upon which an award may be based. Hackford
v. Industrial Commission, 11 Utah 2d, 312, 358 P.2d
899.
Appellant cites on page 6 of his brief what he sets
out as a quotation from the case of Utah-Idaho Cent.
R. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 71 Utah 490, 267 P.
785. We cannot find this quotation in the case. We
assume that it is a quotation from some text which
cites the case in support thereof. The case cited does
not decide exactly as indicated by the quotation. It
does, however, hold "A latent disease or trouble, if
accelerated or lighted up by an industrial accident and
a more serious injury results by reason of the fact of
the existence of such latent ailment than otherwise
would in a normal recovery from injuries received
from or in an accident, in such case the injured employee
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is entitled to additional compensation." (PP. 787 and
788 of 267 P). The case did not hold, however, that the
Industrial Commission might make an award without
substantial evidence. In the case, the Commission made
a finding that the employee had 50lfo disability based
upon a report of a medical board and the testimony
of doctors at the hearing. The Supreme Court stated
on page 787 of 267 P:
"The report of the medical board quoted is
some evidence that applicant has sustained permanent partial disability. The report of Dr.
Baldwin, quoted, also recognizes that applicant
has suffered some disability. The commission is
the fact-finding body. If there is any substantial
evidence to support its findings, such findings
are conclusive upon this court."
The only question involved in the cited case was
if the finding of the Commission was supported by any
substantial testimony.
We have no quarrel with the decision and submit
it in support of respondents' contention that the finding
of the Commission in the case now before the court
should not be disturbed.

POINT 2
The Commission could not have made an award
based only upon the report of Dr. Burke M. Snow and
did not act arbitrarily and capriciously in not adopting
his conclusions.
6
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The quotation set out on page 7 of appellant's
brief as being a statement of the Supreme Court of
Utah in the case of Gunnison Sugar Co. v. Industrial
Commission_, 73 Utah 535, 275 P .777, cannot be found
by us.
The case cited is entirely different from "the present
case before the court. There is nothing in the record in
the present case which indicates that the employer was
not furnishing medical care for the injured employee.
In the Gunnision Sugar Co. case, the employer acquiesced in the employee seeking medical attention from
doctors of his choice and the court decided only that
in that situation the employee was entitled to recover
compensation for the extracation of his teeth, upon
the recommendation of a doctor who the injured employee consulted, because he would have been so entitled
if the employer had furnished or selected the doctor.
The Commission, upon recommendation of the
Referee, adopted the report of the medical panel. (R.
45-46). The medical panel had before it the report of
Dr. Snow and attached it to its report and quoted from
it. (R. 25). The report of Dr. Snow was, therefore, not
ignored. The Commission was not required to accept
the conclusions of Dr. Snow. It could not make an
award based only thereon without other substantial
evidence upon which it could make a finding in favor of
applicant's contention. Ogden Iron Works v. Industrial
Commission_, 102 Utah 492, 132 P.2d 376.

7
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

POINT 3
The order of the Industrial Commission not requiring employer to pay doctor bills incurred by employee
for examination by doctors of his own choice consulted
without permission of employer or order of the Commission is not contrary to law and is not contrary to the
facts of the case.
This point apparently involves the refusal of the
employer to pay _$55.00 for X-Rays taken by Donald
K. Bailey, M.D., which were apparently taken at the
suggestion of Dr. Snow. (R. 21, 22 and 23). The Commission did not require the employer to pay. After the
question of payment of this expen~e and the cost of
a corset were brought up at the hearing of September 4,
1962, the employer agreed to pay the cost of the corset
and so advised the Referee of the Industrial Commission by letter dated September 7, 1962. (R. 44). On
this letter, Commissioner Wiesley apparently called
to the attention of the Referee Rule 10 of the Industrial
Commission that the employer has choice of M.D. and
that charge cannot be made against employer for expense of another doctor without permission of the Comrmsswn.
To support appellant's contention, he cites the case
of Marl-cer v. Industrial Commission_, 84 Utah 587, 37
P .2d 785. Like the other quotations in appellant's brief,
we cannot find in the books cited the quotation. The
case cited was one in which payment was required to
be made to employee, not by employer, but out of a
8
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special fund provided by R. S. Utah 1933, Sec. 42-1-62,
wherein it was provided that where an employee previously injured and suffering permanent and complete
loss of use of part of his body who is subsequently injured in the course of his employment would receive
from his employer or its insurance carrier an award
for the last injury and in addition thereto, might get
some additional benefits payable from the special fund
but not from the employer or its insurance carrier.
The case does not support the statement by appellant on page 8 of his brief, "Therefore, if an employee
already had only one eye or leg or hand, the employer
becomes liable for total disability upon the loss of the
remaining eye, or leg or hand." The cited case is not in
point on the problem under consideration
We submit that the record in this case does not
support a requirement for the employer to pay for the
services of a doctor selected by employee to make the
examination of him, not consented to by the employer
or ordered by the Commission.

POINT 4
Although the report of Dr. Burke M. Snow is
competent and admissible evidence~ the Commission did
not act arbitrarily and capriciously in adopting the report of the medical panel.
Like the other quotations, we cannot find in the
books cited the quote appearing on page 8 of appellant's
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brief, although the case of Hackford v. Industrial Commission~ 11 Utah 2d 312, 358 P.2d 899, is authority for
the proposition that a physician's report might properly
be received in evidence even though it is hearsay.
This does not require the Commission to make a
finding in favor of appellant based upon the report of
Dr. Snow. In the Hackford case, the Supreme Court
set aside an award of the Industrial Commission where
the medical panel had made a report which had been
objected to by the applicant and where no testimony
was given by any member of the panel and where another doctor had made a report but did not testify. A
report alone is not sufficient to sustain an award unless
it is the report of the medical panel to which no objection
is made.
"This Court has uniformly held that hearsay testimony is admissible, but just as uniformly held that a
finding of fact cannot be based solely upon hearsay
evidence." Ogden Iron Works v. Industrial Commission~ 102 Utah 492, 132 P.2d 376 at page 380.
In the case of Burton v. Industrial Commission,
13 Utah 2d 353, 374 P.2d 439, this court decided that
it was not capricious, arbitrary or unreasonable for the
Commission to accept the medical panel's report and
testimony of the members of the medical panel even
though there was evidence contrary thereto.
"Assuming without deciding that the plaintiff's
evidence if uncontradicted would be sufficient

10
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to sustain a finding in her favor, it is indisputable
that the testimony just referred to is sufficient
to sustain a finding to the contrary. There being
no basis upon which this court could say that the
Commission acted capriciously, arbitrarily or unreasonably in denying the application, its order is
affirmed." ( P. 440 of 37 4 P .2d) .

POINT 5

The Industrial Commission may adopt the findings
of a medical panel supported by testimony of a member
thereof.
Although we do not disagree with Point 5 as stated
by appellant, we do not infer that the Commission
must reject the findings of the medical panel supported
by testimony and adopt findings contrary thereto based
upon other substantial conflicting evidence which supports a contrary finding. By this statement, we do not
admit that in this case there is any conflicting substantial
non hearsay evidence contrary to the findings of the
medical panel upon which the Commission made its
finding.

CONCLUSION
The decision of the Industrial Commission should
be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
11
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